Custom DMARC, DKIM, SPF and DNSSEC monitoring
Setting up SPF, DKIM and DMARC is an afternoon's work. Knowing who sends on behalf of your domain is not. The reports that answer that question arrive daily as XML from dozens of receiving parties, and as long as nobody reads them, your policy stays on p=none and protects nothing.
Why p=none stays the end state
The three email standards work together. SPF says which servers may send on behalf of your domain, DKIM puts a signature on the message, and DMARC determines what a recipient should do if either of those fails. Alongside them sits DNSSEC, which signs the DNS responses themselves so they cannot be forged in transit. They are on the list of open standards for which the comply-or-explain principle applies, and internet.nl tests for them publicly.
The setup is not the problem. The problem is the step from p=none to quarantine and ultimately reject. As long as you do not know which systems send on your behalf, that step is a gamble: set the policy too strictly too early, and invoices, password reset emails or newsletters from a marketing package that nobody had on the list will disappear.
The only source that makes this visible is the DMARC reports. Receiving parties send a daily overview of what they have seen on behalf of your domain, in XML, per sending server. With ten domains, that means hundreds of files a week. Opening them by hand happens for two weeks, and then no longer. That is why the policy stays on p=none. You can have your domain tested publicly at internet.nl.
How we build this
The order is: first see, then tighten. Any proposal to tighten the policy before the senders have been mapped is a proposal to lose email.
Not only your main domain but also the domains you once registered and never used. Those are the ones that get abused, because no policy is set on them and nobody is looking at them.
Set up the addresses where the reports arrive and let that stream run, without changing anything in the policy yet. After a few weeks you have a picture you can base decisions on.
Every sprint ends with something you can check for yourself, and we start with processing the reports and making them readable. Without that screen, tightening the policy is a gamble.
Per domain from p=none to quarantine and then reject, with a percentage that you increase. At each step you see what would have been rejected before it actually happens.
What the integration actually does
Processing reports is the core; monitoring DNS records is what prevents it from quietly breaking again.
Reports processed and readable
The daily XML from receiving parties is read in and combined into a single view: which sender, which domain, how many messages, and whether SPF and DKIM passed. That is the information on which you base a policy decision.
Unknown senders highlighted
A sending server you do not recognise is either a marketing package that a department bought on its own, or someone abusing your domain. The distinction between the two is exactly what you want to see before tightening the policy.
Effect of a policy change in advance
What would have been rejected if you had been on reject now. You ask that question before the change, not after, and the answer determines whether you are ready for it.
Monitoring your DNS records
An SPF record that grows too long after an administrator edits it, or a DKIM key that expires, will break your email without warning. We monitor continuously and alert you the moment it happens.
DNSSEC status per domain
Whether the zone is signed and whether the signature stays valid. An expired or broken signature makes your domain unreachable for some resolvers, and you only find out when customers call.
History for accountability
Which policy was in place on which domain and when, and what the traffic looked like at the time. In an audit or a review against open standards, it is the supporting evidence; in an incident, it is the timeline.
Who we build for
The number of domains and the number of departments buying their own services determine how messy things get. Four situations.
Government and public organisations
Here the open standards apply under the comply-or-explain principle, and internet.nl makes the score public. That makes it visible in a way that is missing elsewhere. If a broader security assessment is also under way, see ICT security assessment.
Organisations with many domains
Brands, campaigns and old domains that were never shut down. The unused domains are the biggest risk, because they often have no policy at all. If a broader risk register is also under way, see IT risk management.
Financial services and healthcare
Where phishing in your name causes direct damage. Here, moving to reject is not a compliance question but a damage-limitation one, and therefore more urgent. If you fall under the reporting obligation of the Cybersecurity Act, an incident belongs there; see incident reporting portal.
Managed service providers and agencies
You manage domains for multiple clients and need the same monitoring per client with a strict separation between them. Standard packages are often built for a single organisation.
Technology and integrations
Reports arrive in varying quality, so ingestion has to be fault-tolerant. And the DNS check looks from multiple locations, because a record that is correct from your office may be answered differently elsewhere.
If your healthcare organisation sends messages containing health information from your own systems, also take a look at our NTA 7516 integration.
Why Appfront
See before you tighten
Anyone can set p=reject. The question is whether you know what will stop working. We build the insight first and only then the step.
The surprise is in your own departments
In practice, the unknown sender is more often a marketing tool than an attacker. You want to see both, and the distinction matters for what you do about it.
It quietly breaks again later
An administrator edits an SPF record, a key expires, a zone is moved. Without continuous monitoring, you only notice when customers call.
Honest about what this does not solve
DMARC protects your domain against misuse of your name. It does not protect you against phishing from lookalike domains or against a compromised account. Those require other measures.
Security and privacy
DMARC reports contain more than technical data. Aggregate reports are aggregated and therefore fairly harmless, but forensic reports can contain fragments of individual messages, including sender, recipient and subject. That is personal data, and many receiving parties send them only in limited form or not at all for that reason. Only enable them if you know why, and retain them for a shorter period than the aggregate reports.
This file is also valuable to an attacker in its own right: it shows exactly which systems send on your behalf, which domains are weak and which policies are still at p=none. In effect, it is an attack map. We therefore keep access tight and role-based, and strictly separated per client for managing parties. We also record, for each domain, which policy change was made, when and by whom, because the first question after an incident is what changed shortly beforehand. Our own approach to security is set out in our information security policy; external reports go through our CVD policy.
Frequently asked questions about DMARC and DNSSEC
SPF specifies which servers may send on behalf of your domain. DKIM adds a cryptographic signature to a message, so the recipient can verify it has not been altered in transit. DMARC ties the two to your domain name and tells a recipient what to do when the checks fail: nothing, quarantine, or reject. Without DMARC, the first two remain optional in practice.
Because nobody reads the reports. That is not a criticism: they are daily XML files from dozens of parties, and with multiple domains there are hundreds per week. Without processing them, you do not know which systems send on your behalf, and tightening the policy then risks legitimate email going missing. Insight is the prerequisite, not the setting.
Legitimate email gets rejected without anyone noticing. Think of invoices from an accounting package, password resets from an application, or a newsletter from a tool a department bought on its own. That is why we build a simulation: you see what would have been rejected before it actually happens.
They are on the list of open standards covered by the comply-or-explain principle for government bodies, and internet.nl tests for them publicly. For other organisations they are not legally required but are standard practice, and receiving parties are becoming stricter. Whether and how they apply to you is something to establish with your own adviser; we build the monitoring.
SPF, DKIM and DMARC all live in DNS. Anyone who can forge those DNS responses bypasses them. DNSSEC signs the responses so that this is not possible. It is therefore not a separate topic but the foundation underneath. Note that an expired or broken signature can make your domain unreachable for some resolvers, so monitoring matters more here than for the other three.
We can, but we recommend keeping monitoring and management separate: the system that checks whether something is correct should not be the same system that changes it. In practice, we build the monitoring and the simulation, and changing records stays with your own administrator or provider, with an alert from the system when something needs doing.
Yes, and that is usually the reason for building it. Each client keeps their own domains and reports, with an overview on top showing which client has which policy and where it is weak. Separation between clients is a design requirement here: this file describes exactly where someone is vulnerable. The link to your own systems runs through integrations.
That depends on the number of domains, whether forensic reports are included and whether multiple clients need to run separately. Processing the aggregate reports with the sender overview is usually quick to put to use and delivers the most value; the DNS monitoring and the simulation cost more. We provide a substantiated estimate after the discovery phase.
Ready to build DMARC monitoring?
Ask your administrator which DMARC policy is set on your main domain. If the answer is p=none, nobody has ever gone through the reports, and you know where this project begins. We build this as a standalone application and as part of a broader custom software programme.