Custom incident reporting portal with a 24-hour workflow
The Cyberbeveiligingswet (the Dutch Cybersecurity Act) has applied since 15 August 2026. If it covers you, you must send an early warning within 24 hours of a significant incident and a full notification within 72 hours, both counted from the moment you became aware of the incident. The final report follows within a month, but counted from that 72-hour notification. So there are two starting points, and that is where things go wrong in practice.
What the reporting obligation requires of you
The Cyberbeveiligingswet is the Dutch implementation of the European NIS2 Directive and came into force on 15 August 2026, together with the Wet weerbaarheid kritieke entiteiten (Critical Entities Resilience Act). It affects eighteen sectors and more than eight thousand organisations, which must determine for themselves whether they qualify as an essential or an important entity. The Act imposes three things: a duty of care for your measures, a registration duty requiring you to register your organisation in the entity register on MijnNCSC, and a reporting obligation. The latter is bound by strict deadlines.
The chain has three moments and two reference points. Within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident, you send an early warning. Within 72 hours of that same moment, the full notification follows, with what you know by then about the nature, scale and consequences. The final report is due within a month of that notification, not within a month of discovery; that makes a difference of three days, and it is the mistake that appears most often in incident playbooks.
If the incident lasts longer than that month, the deadline shifts. At that point you send a progress report, and the final report follows within a month of the incident being resolved. In addition, your CSIRT or your supervisory authority may request an interim report; that is different from the progress report, and it comes at their request, not according to your calendar.
Two exceptions change your entire set-up. If you are a trust service provider, the second deadline is 24 hours rather than 72. And if you fall under a European sector-specific law with its own reporting rules, such as DORA for the financial sector, you report via that route and not this one. Establish this before you build anything, because it determines whom you report to and within what deadline. The NCSC describes the reporting chain and the exceptions at ncsc.nl.
You report via the central reporting point on MijnNCSC, and that single notification reaches both the sector CSIRT and your supervisory authority. That is the easy part. The hard part comes before it: someone has to notice that something is wrong, assess whether it is significant, and start the clock from the right moment. At organisations where this runs through email and a group chat, the first thing missing when a supervisory authority asks is not the notification but the time of discovery.
The reporting chain is one obligation within a larger whole. The duty of care around it, with the justification for each measure, is covered on Cyberbeveiligingswet software; if you have been designated a critical entity, the Wwke also applies, with its own reporting deadline.
At a Seveso establishment, the report starts at the installation itself, during a round or an exercise. How you record that is covered on the Seveso app page.
In healthcare, a second reporting chain runs with its own deadlines: three working days after determination, towards the inspectorate. See Wkkgz software. Reporting on the shop floor starts with the reporting app.
When work is carried out on an installation, the cause of an incident often lies in the release that preceded it: what was made safe and who signed. That chain is covered in the app for work permits and isolation.
Reports from employees about suspected wrongdoing follow a different channel, with protection of the reporter at its core. See the internal whistleblowing app.
How we build your reporting portal
The thresholds are set out in the ministerial regulation for your sector; how you apply them to a specific signal remains up to you and your legal adviser. What we build is the system that carries out that assessment, records it and attaches deadlines to it.
Who notices an incident, who assesses whether it is significant, who may report on behalf of the organisation and who takes over outside office hours. At most organisations this is not documented anywhere, and it is the first place where 24 hours are lost.
The thresholds from your sector's ministerial regulation, the timers and the points at which the system escalates. If your regulator's guidance changes, you adjust it without needing a rebuild.
This is the part that has to work during a real incident, so that is where the build starts. Your own people run an early exercise with an interim version, because that is where you find out whether the route holds up.
We play through an incident from signal to final report and look at where it gets stuck. That is usually not the technology but the question of who decides in the middle of the night.
What the portal actually does
A reporting obligation only becomes a working chain once each of these six steps is assigned to someone. How many of them you need depends on your size and on the number of signals coming in.
One entry point for signals
Reports from within your own organisation, from your suppliers and from your monitoring arrive in one place via integrations, with a timestamp. As long as signals travel by email, the moment of discovery can no longer be established afterwards.
Assessment against your sector's thresholds
The threshold values differ per sector and are worked out per department in ministerial regulations. The assessment becomes a fixed set of questions that follows those thresholds, with the outcome and the reasoning recorded. Even a "no" is a decision you will want to be able to show.
Two timers side by side
The first starts from the moment of becoming aware and monitors the 24 and 72 hours. The second only starts when the full report is submitted and monitors the month that follows. If the incident continues, it switches to the progress report and counts again from resolution.
Structure of the three reports
The early warning, the full report and the final report build on each other, so what you knew at 24 hours does not have to be entered again and the later reports visibly add to it rather than overwrite it.
Escalation that cannot go quiet
If the first person responsible does not respond within the agreed time, the signal moves further up. An incident that starts on a Saturday evening must not be discovered on Monday morning.
A file per incident
The timeline, the assessments, the reports sent and the measures taken, all in one place. That is what you need for a final report and what a regulator asks for.
Who we build for
The eighteen sectors differ widely, but the reporting chain breaks down in the same place every time: at the question of who decides outside office hours. Four situations where this plays out differently.
Government and public services
Here the reporting obligation runs alongside existing obligations, including data breach notification. If you work with the BIO framework, the measures overlap considerably, but the reporting routes differ.
Healthcare
An incident here directly affects the continuity of care, which changes the assessment: a system outage becomes significant more quickly than elsewhere. The 24-hour deadline coincides with the moment everyone is busy dealing with the outage.
Energy, water and transport
Heavier sectors that often already have their own reporting practice towards a sector regulator. The pitfall is that two routes emerge side by side and drift out of step, while your risk register holds only one picture.
Manufacturing, digital infrastructure and service providers
Many organisations in these sectors are now subject to a reporting obligation for the first time. The work starts with the question of who actually decides that a report is made. That is not the same as building NIS2-compliant software: that page covers the measures within your applications, while this one covers the reporting chain around them.
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One design requirement outranks all others here: this system has to work at the moment your own environment may not. An incident can hit your network, and a reporting portal behind that same login is worthless.
If you are dealing with incidents and critical incidents in healthcare, take a look at our incident and critical incident reporting system.
Why Appfront
Two starting points, not one
The 24 and 72 hours run from becoming aware of the incident; the month for the final report runs from the notification itself. We record the moment of awareness at the first signal rather than at the decision that it is serious, and we then keep counting from the correct reference point.
Works when everything else doesn't
A reporting portal inside the same environment that has been hit is not a reporting portal. We set it up separately and make sure it stays reachable without your own network.
A no is a decision too
Most signals do not lead to a report. It is precisely those assessments that you need to record, because a regulator's question is about what you did not report.
Honest about what we don't do
We do not determine whether your organisation falls under the law, nor whether an incident is significant. That is work for you and your lawyer. We build the system that applies and records your assessment.
Security and privacy
An incident file is one of the most sensitive files in your organisation. It describes exactly which systems were vulnerable, how someone got in and how long it took you to notice. In the wrong hands, it is a ready-made manual. That is why we keep access tight and per incident, rather than covering the whole history.
The most important design choice is that this system is separate from the environment that could be affected. A portal running on the same network, behind the same login and with the same admin rights, is unreachable at exactly the moment of an incident. In addition, the timeline per incident is immutable: you can add to it but not rewrite it, because a file in which the moment of discovery can be shifted afterwards has no value to a regulator. How we handle security ourselves is set out in our information security policy; reports from outside go through our CVD policy.
Frequently asked questions about the reporting obligation
An early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware of a significant incident, and the full notification within 72 hours of that same moment. The final report is due within a month of that notification, not within a month of discovery. If the incident lasts longer than that month, you send a progress report at that point and the final report follows within a month of the incident being resolved. A single notification goes to the sector CSIRT and to your regulator.
At the moment you became aware of the incident, not at the moment you establish that it is significant. That distinction is the heart of the problem: if a report reaches the service desk on a Friday afternoon and is only assessed on Monday, the deadline has already passed. That is why we record the first signal with a timestamp, even if the assessment follows later.
That is for you to determine, and it is a legal assessment we do not make. It concerns eighteen sectors, where your size and your role decide whether you are an essential or an important entity. The Dutch central government provides tools to check this. Our portal is about what you do once you fall within scope.
No, and the criteria are not yours to set either: the thresholds differ per sector and are worked out per ministry in ministerial regulations. The software applies those thresholds and records the outcome with its justification; the decision stays with a person. We deliberately build the assessment as a fixed set of questions that leads to a decision, so nobody has to improvise under time pressure and so it is clear afterwards why a report was or was not made.
Then the reporting portal still needs to work, which is why we place it separately from your production environment, with its own access route. A system behind the same login as the affected environment is unreachable at exactly the wrong moment. This requirement shapes the design more than any feature does.
The routes are different and so are the thresholds: a data breach concerns personal data and has its own 72-hour deadline towards the Dutch Data Protection Authority. A single incident can fall under both. What works is one entry point and one timeline, followed by two outgoing routes that each monitor their own deadline, so nothing is recorded twice.
The reporting obligation is the visible half; the duty of care concerns the measures you put in place and, in practice, is the bigger job. The two meet in the final report, where you describe what you have done. A reporting portal is not a way of meeting the duty of care, and we do not present it as one. For that side, look instead at a security assessment and at your register of measures. If you place products with digital elements on the market yourself, you also have the reporting chain of the Cyber Resilience Act, which runs to ENISA and concerns your product rather than your organisation.
That depends on the number of signal sources, your escalation scheme and whether integrations with monitoring or a service desk are added. The reporting chain itself is usually usable quickly and delivers the most value; the integrations cost more. If your team works from their phones, we build the reporting side as an app. We give a substantiated estimate after the discovery phase.
Building an incident reporting portal?
Walk through one incident from last year with us, from the first signal to the last email. In that conversation it becomes clear where your chain loses time. We build this as a standalone portal and as part of a broader custom software project. For preventing misuse of your domain name, see DMARC and DNSSEC monitoring.