At least once every three years The supervisory authority designates you The attestation comes from the authority

Custom software for the TLPT process under DORA

Threat-led penetration testing is the most demanding form of testing under DORA, Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, and it is not a general obligation. Your supervisory authority decides whether you must carry out such tests. From the moment you are designated, a fixed process applies, with its own roles, its own deadlines and documents that the authority approves one by one.

What the regime requires of you

Article 26 of DORA imposes advanced testing on financial entities that have been designated for it. They carry out a TLPT at least every three years, and the competent authority may reduce or increase that frequency. Microenterprises and the entities referred to in Article 16(1) are excluded. Which entities are designated is decided by the authority itself, based on impact-related factors, systemic character and ICT risk profile.

The detailed rules have now been adopted. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 of 13 February 2025 was published in the Official Journal on 18 June 2025 and contains firm criteria. Systemically important credit institutions fall within scope, as do central securities depositories and central counterparties. For payment institutions, the threshold is €150 billion in payment transactions in each of the two preceding calendar years.

The test covers several or all critical or important functions and runs on live production systems. You decide which functions are included, but the authority validates that outcome and the scoping document goes through your management body. This page covers only that testing regime. The ICT risk framework, the incident register and the register of outsourcing arrangements are covered on our page about DORA compliance software.

How we build this

The process begins with a notification from the TLPT authority and ends with an attestation. In between are documents that each need their own approval.

1
The designation and the initial documents

Within three months of the notification, you deliver a project charter, the control team lead and the code name. The scoping document follows within six months.

2
Separating the roles and keeping them separate

The control team, blue team, testers and the threat intelligence provider each have their own position. Access follows need-to-know, and a system should enforce that.

3
The deliverables as one series

The scoping document, threat intelligence report, red team test plan, both test reports, the summary and the remediation plan belong together, in a single file with versions and approvals.

4
Findings through to closure

Every finding gets a root-cause analysis, a prioritised measure, an owner and the risk of not acting. That is what the RTS requires of a remediation plan.

What the software actually does

The dossier holds everything together. What you set up around it depends on the number of functions in scope and the number of parties taking part.

The scoping document with its justification

Which functions go in and why, with the underlying systems, processes and technologies. The RTS also requires a justification for what you leave out of scope.

The risk assessment of the test itself

You are unleashing attacks on production systems. The assessment covers disruption, data damage and escalation, and continues for as long as the test lasts.

Need-to-know access

Only the control team, the management body, the testers, the threat intelligence provider and the authority. The test gets a code name, and nothing more appears in the system.

Recording the suitability of providers

CVs, certifications, references and professional liability insurance. This documentation must be in place before contracts are signed.

The deadlines of the closing phase

The red team test report within four weeks, the blue team report no later than ten weeks after the end of the active phase.

From finding to action

Every vulnerability gets a root cause, a remedial action, a priority and an owner, and ties in with your audit software.

Who we build for

The designation affects very different institutions. Four situations.

Banks and systemically important institutions

Credit institutions designated as globally or otherwise systemically important are named in the RTS. Significant credit institutions may only use external testers. See also software for the financial sector.

Payments and electronic money

Above €150 billion in payment transactions in each of the two preceding calendar years, designation comes into play, with a threshold of €40 billion in outstanding balance for electronic money.

Custody, clearing and trading

Central securities depositories and central counterparties appear in the text without a threshold; trading venues are added on the basis of market share. Hosting then becomes part of the question, via a sovereign cloud.

Insurers and reinsurers

The RTS works in two steps here: first thresholds for premiums, technical provisions and share of total assets, and within that group a second set.

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Technology and integrations

The RTS prescribes what belongs in the documents, not what they look like. Templates, roles and approvals should be configurable, so that the next test does not start from scratch.

Web application with roles and permissions Templates for the RTS annexes Version control with approval steps Separation between control team and blue team Marking of sensitive information Code name instead of project name Register of providers and references Deadline monitoring from the end of the test phase Findings with root cause and priority Integration with issue and risk register Export for the supervisor Immutable audit logging Retention periods per document Hosting in the EU

Why Appfront

A process with a fixed sequence

We build the steps in the order the RTS follows, with approval as a condition for the next. A dossier that ignores that order reveals gaps afterwards.

The attestation is the final step

The authority confirms in an attestation that the test was carried out in line with the requirements, and examines a list of documents for this. That list should be complete at that point.

Separation you can demonstrate

Who has seen what and when is part of the evidence here. We record access and viewing rather than relying on the agreement that nobody is looking over anyone's shoulder.

We do not carry out the test

You hire the red team separately, with Article 27 as the benchmark. We build the system around it, alongside, for example, DevSecOps.

Security and privacy

A TLPT file contains the weak points in your critical functions, the attack paths that worked and the systems that were hit along the way. That is the information someone else could use to attack you. The RTS calls this sensitive information and allows the test managers to request reports from which it is omitted. We build that separation into the document itself, so that producing such a version is not a matter of cutting and pasting after the fact.

Confidentiality is part of the outcome here: the RTS names a breach of the test's confidentiality as a reason why the attestation may not be issued. We set access by role, keep the blue team out of the system until the control team informs it, and log every access. How we handle security ourselves is set out in our information security policy; reports from outside go through our CVD policy.

Frequently asked questions about TLPT under DORA

No, it is a selection. The competent authorities designate who is subject to this obligation, based on impact-related factors, systemic character and ICT risk profile. Micro-enterprises and entities under the simplified ICT framework are exempt; the RTS adds further thresholds.

At least every three years, according to Article 26 of DORA. The authority can reduce or increase that frequency based on your risk profile. This is separate from Article 24, which requires at least annual testing of the ICT systems behind critical or important functions.

Yes. Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190 of 13 February 2025 was published on 18 June 2025 and entered into force on the twentieth day after that. It covers the identification criteria, the use of internal testers, the phases and the cooperation between authorities.

DNB developed TIBER-NL in 2016; the ECB subsequently drew up TIBER-EU, inspired by that approach. On 11 February 2025, TIBER-EU was updated to align with the RTS. Purple teaming became mandatory as part of this, and the role previously called the White Team is now called the Control Team.

Only under certain conditions. The authority must approve it and have verified that you are committing sufficient resources and ruling out conflicts of interest; the threat intelligence provider is always external. Every third test, you must bring in external testers.

In it, the authority confirms that the test was carried out in accordance with the requirements, so that other authorities recognise it. It states, among other things, the scope and the duration of the active red team phase. An attestation is not an endorsement of your ability to manage ICT risk; DORA states this explicitly.

We build the system around the process and the evidence: scoping, roles, documents, deadlines and follow-up. The testing itself is carried out by testers who meet the requirements of Article 27. For the rest of DORA there is DORA compliance software, for a regular assessment the ICT security assessment, and for the moment during the test the TLPT app.

That depends on the number of functions in scope, whether third-party providers are taking part and whether it is a joint or pooled test. The file is usually the first part to become usable. We give a substantiated estimate after the discovery phase.

Want to know whether your file will earn the attestation?

Take out your scoping document and check whether, for every function you left out of scope, it states why. That justification is a requirement of the RTS and the first thing the test managers look at. We build this as a standalone system and as part of a broader software development project.

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