SPDX or CycloneDX: which should we choose?
Both are widely used and both are accepted. SPDX is an ISO standard and is common where licence information is central, for example in due diligence. CycloneDX comes from the security world and fits somewhat more naturally with vulnerability management and VEX. In practice, you can convert almost any list between the two, so it is rarely a choice you are locked into. We look at what your customers ask for and which tooling you already use, and follow that.
How deep should the list go?
The Cyber Resilience Act requires at least the top layer of dependencies. For answering the question "does this affect us?", that is too shallow: most reported vulnerabilities sit in components that came along with your choices and that you therefore never wrote down yourself. By default, we generate the full tree and also deliver an extract of the top layer for where that is sufficient. It takes the same effort and makes the answer far more useful.
Do we have to make the list public?
No. The obligation is that you have it and can provide it on request to those entitled to it, primarily the market surveillance authority. What you share with customers is up to you. Some organisations share a full copy under a non-disclosure agreement, others only confirm that a specific component is not used. That is a commercial consideration, not a legal one.
What if a supplier doesn't give us a list?
That is the same question, one link further down the chain. For purchased components, you can often establish what is inside yourself by scanning the delivered artefacts, but the result is rarely complete. The practical route is to put it in your procurement terms and enforce it at renewal. We can help draft that wording; it is the same clause your own customers are now putting to you.
What is VEX and do we need it?
VEX stands for Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange: a statement in which you record whether a reported vulnerability actually affects your product. A critical flaw in a component that you ship but never call is no problem for your customer, but without a statement their scanner only sees the component and the score. You need it as soon as your customers start scanning themselves, because it saves you and them a lot of unnecessary questions.
Will this change how we develop?
Very little, and that is the intention. Generation happens automatically and requires no manual step. What does change is that a new dependency with an unwanted licence or a known vulnerability becomes visible the moment someone adds it, rather than months later. That is a short conversation at the right moment, and it prevents the long conversation at the wrong moment.
What does the first list usually show?
Almost always the same picture: the number of components is a multiple of what the team expected, a handful haven't been updated in years, and at least one licence was never knowingly accepted. Most findings are resolved with a version update. The value isn't in the count but in the fact that the question can be answered for the first time.
Does this also work for older software?
Yes, and that's often where it's most useful. With a system that has been running for years, usually nobody knows exactly what's in it any more. Generating the list works the same way, although very old build pipelines may need some adaptation. In practice, the first list delivers the most value here, and it often becomes the starting point for a conversation about
modernisation.
What about containers and operating systems?
They're included. A container image contains, besides your code, an operating system layer with dozens of packages, and that's where a large share of reported vulnerabilities sit. We include that layer in the list, because otherwise the scan gives a clean result while the vulnerability sits one level lower. The same applies to base images you source from a vendor.
Will this cost us a new subscription?
Not necessarily. Generating the list itself can be done with open tooling that fits into your existing build pipeline. For managing the lists across many products and versions, a central system is useful, and there are both open and paid options. We advise based on how many products and versions you have, and start with what you already run. We'll discuss any recurring costs with you upfront.
Who needs to manage this on our side?
Generating the list manages itself. What needs attention is assessing the exceptions: which component deliberately stays on an old version and why, and when do we review it again. That belongs with the same person or role that assesses the vulnerabilities, because it's the same trade-off. Without an owner, the exceptions register grows until nobody looks at it any more.